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BAD ARGUMENTS AGAINST GAY MARRIAGE
Dale Carpenter*
The debate over gay marriage has been marred by bad arguments
on both sides of the issue. This essay refutes the three worst arguments
against gay marriage.
A few preliminary disclaimers, qualifications, and definitions are in
order. First, I support gay marriage as a policy matter, so perhaps I am
biased about what makes an argument against gay marriage especially bad,
and therefore run the related risk of making bad arguments against bad
arguments. But I am familiar enough with the arguments on both sides of
this controversy that I think I know a stinker when I smell one. There are
some credible-though ultimately unpersuasive-arguments against gay
marriage, dealing mostly with respect for long-standing traditions,'
empirical uncertainty about the effect of gay couples on their children,2 and
the possibility of unintended cultural consequences. These types of
arguments have to be addressed carefully by advocates of gay marriage.
But that is not my purpose here. In this essay, I pick the low-hanging fruit.
Second, I address only the common bad arguments against gay
marriage, the kind that many people find persuasive. Of course, there are
many uncommon bad arguments against gay marriage. For example, I
recently heard someone say that we have to prevent gay marriage so that
we can win the war in Iraq. This strikes me as involving an awfully long
causal chain.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank
the participants in this symposium, who listened politely while I disparaged their dearest
ideas. For their comments on this paper, I would like to thank Stephen Clark, Mary Lou
Fellows, Brett McDonnell, Jon Rauch, Daria Roithmayr, Mark Strasser, and Eugene
Volokh. I would also like to thank my research assistant, Kari Bomash, for her invaluable
help and comments on this paper.
1 See, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 268-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
2 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2112
(2005).
3 See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzchild, Editor's Symposium: The Meaning of Marriage:
Marriage, Pluralism, and Change: A Response to Professor Wax, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1115, 1120 (2005).
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Third, I do not disparage the smarts of anyone who has made these
bad arguments. Smart people sometimes make bad arguments. Indeed,
many gay-marriage opponents have been very skilled at putting the best
possible face on these arguments. But a pig wearing lipstick is still a pig.
Fourth, what makes a bad argument bad? I have in mind three
types of flaws that make an argument bad. An argument may suffer only
one of these flaws, from two of them, or in the case of a truly atrocious
argument, from all three. The first type is the logical flaw, which is
characterized by an internal incoherence. For example, a logical flaw
exists where a conclusion does not follow from the asserted premise(s), as
in "blue is the color of the sky, so Shakespeare really did write those
plays," or where the argument asserts the conclusion as the argument, as in
"the flat tax is a good idea, so we should have a flat tax."
The second type of flaw is the experientialflaw. This type of flaw
relies on claims or premises that either do not match up with common real-
world experience, such as "three-year-olds are mature enough to vote," or
that make claims that may be true but that are highly contestable and are
without adequate justification within the argument itself, as in "intelligent
design as an explanation for human development is true, so it should be
taught in science classes."
The third type of flaw is the politicalflaw. An argument suffering
a political flaw is counter-productive in that making the argument actually
undermines the case in the eyes of many people who will evaluate it. This
type of argument, whether right or wrong on its own merits, urges people
to reach what they already agree is the correct result for a reason they
dislike. This may actually cause them to doubt whether the result they
thought was right is indeed right. For example, "blacks and whites should
be separated in a prison race riot because blacks are inferior."
Finally, I am addressing what I think are bad policy arguments.
This is not necessarily the same as saying that these arguments would be
unsuccessful if made in the context of constitutional litigation challenging
the exclusion of gay couples from marriage. Consider that a good deal of
policy drivel will satisfy the rational-basis test in constitutional law. If the
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rational-basis test is the appropriate standard of review for gay-marriage
claims, some or all of the bad arguments discussed here may prove
successful. For example, under rational-basis review, the fact that existing
marriage laws allow non-procreative heterosexual couples to marry might
not be fatal, even where procreation is the state's claimed purpose for
excluding gay couples.4 But I am not interested here in making
constitutional arguments about marriage. Even if the arguments I rebut
could satisfy constitutional scrutiny, they are still bad arguments as a
policy matter.
With all that out of the way, let's wade into the "Big Muddy" of
bad arguments against gay marriage: the definitional argument, the
procreation argument, and the polygamy slippery-slope argument.
I. THE DEFINITIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST GAY MARRIAGE
5
A. The Argument and its Variants
The definitional argument generally takes this form: "Marriage is
only the union of one man and one woman. What same-sex couples are
asking for is not marriage. Therefore, same-sex couples cannot be
married."
There are some slight variations on this form of argument that are
really only the definitional argument masquerading as something else.
First, there is the consummation argument, which goes something like this:
"A marriage does not exist unless consummated, which necessarily (that is,
definitionally) involves the penis-meets-vagina sexual act of a man and a
woman." The New York Times reported that a version of this argument
turned up recently: "During debate over whether Massachusetts should ban
same-sex marriage by state constitutional amendment, state representative
4 Compare Standhart v. Super. Ct. of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. Div. 2003)
(procreation justification satisfies rational-basis review), with Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (procreation justification fails rational-basis
review).
5 The proceeding section is an expanded version of a blog entry by the author, which is
available at The Volokh Conspiracy website, http://volokh.com/posts/l130939774.shtml
(Nov. 5, 2005, 08:56 EST).
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Philip Travis, a Democrat who opposes gay marriage, argued, 'The union
of two women and two men can never consummate a marriage. It's
physically impossible. We can't get around that.' 6 This consummation
variation of the definitional argument is another way of saying that each
marriage requires a functioning penis and a vagina, or that marriage is only
the union of a man and a woman. 7
A second variation of the definitional argument involves some
analogy to species-confusion. A common example is: "Gay marriage is
like trying to call a cat a dog. A cat will never be a dog no matter how
much you try to call it a dog, or treat it like a dog, or pretend it's a dog."
One can substitute an infinite variety of species combinations for "cat" and
"dog" here, resulting in the same variation of the definitional argument.
The species-confusion variation is another way of saying that marriage is,
definitionally, male-female. It is saying, without further argument, that
same-sex couples cannot be married just as dogs cannot be cats.
The third variation of the definitional argument involves an analogy
to a government benefits program. For example: "Allowing gay marriage
is like allowing non-veterans to get veterans' benefits. Non-veterans are
not part of the veterans' program, just like gay couples are not part of
marriage. The marriage program is not for gay couples, just like the
veterans' program is not for non-veterans." Or, as one commentator put it:
"Two people of the same-sex cannot 'marry' any more than a man can
claim a right to 'maternity' leave.",8 One can easily substitute young adults
6 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2005, at A14.
7 The consummation variation of the definitional argument has the advantage of apparent
legal support in the form of state statutes that provide for annulling a marriage that goes
unconsummated. "Physical defects and incapacities which render a party unable to
consummate the marriage, and which are incurable are, under most statutes, grounds for
annulment .. " 4 Am. JUR. 2D Annulment of Marriage § 30 (1962) (footnote omitted).
However, this apparent legal support for the consummation argument is just another
manifestation of the very policy being challenged by supporters of gay marriage - the
limitation of marriage to male-female couples. So it is a restatement of the controversy,
not a support for one side.8 E.g., Stephen C. Whiting, Same-sex Marriage Pros and Cons: 'Gay Marriage' is an
Oxymoron, 19 ME. B.J. 79, 83 (2004); id. at 85 ("It is not a denial of equal protection to
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seeking retirement benefits from Social Security, or renters seeking a
home-buyer's mortgage-interest deduction from their taxes, to achieve the
same result. The variations are as numerous as the government benefits
programs that inspire them. This variation of the definitional argument,
too, is another way of arguing that marriage is defmitionally male-female.
It says, without further argument, that same-sex couples simply cannot
qualify for marriage, just as non-veterans cannot qualify for veterans'
benefits.
What is distinctive about the definitional argument is that it makes
no attempt to defend the male-female definition of marriage as a normative
matter. The definition itself is asserted unadorned as an argument against
gay marriage. As soon as a normative defense of the male-female
definition is attached to the argument (for example, "the male-female
definition of marriage is right because children need mothers and
fathers"), the argument is no longer the pure definitional argument, as I use
that term here, and thus is not one of the bad arguments I am addressing.
B. Why the Argument is Attractive
The definitional argument was once among the most common
responses to claims for gay marriage. When the idea of gay marriage first
gained some currency in the aftermath of the gay "Stonewall Riots" of
1969 in New York City,9 the idea of two men or two women marrying was
so outlandish that the definitional argument was the most immediate
expression available for sheer collective astonishment. When people hear
an idea that they have never heard before and that seems outrageous, the
best they can often do is to respond, "Of course not." Culturally and
politically, this is accepted as a sufficient response, at first. An articulated
defense of the male-female definition of marriage was unnecessary prior to
the modern gay-rights movement because hardly anyone supposed
marriage could ever be anything other than a male-female union.
10
limit a government program to those who are physically capable of participating in the
program.").
9 See Ken Harlan, Stone Wall and Beyond: Lesbian and Gay Culture,
www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/exhibitions/sw25/case 1 .html.
10 Some commentators seem miffed even to have to address arguments for gay marriage.
See, e.g., Whiting, supra note 9, at 79 ("When I grew up, everyone knew what marriage
2005]
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If the definitional argument retains any appeal today it is chiefly for
two reasons. First, if it is right, the definitional argument is devastating to
the cause of gay marriage. Saying the words "gay marriage" would be akin
to saying table-chair.'1 It makes no sense. Yes, one could try to pass off a
table as a chair, and one could even use a table as a chair, but we know
these are simply different things. Consider that for the definitionalist
"same-sex marriage" is as alien to the basic definition of the institution as
"one-person marriage."'12
Second, the definitional argument is alternative because it does not
entail making any normative claims about gay people or gay couples. We
do not exclude gay couples from marriage because gays are bad, sinful,
pathological, too promiscuous, or too unstable to deserve the institution.
We need not make contestable empirical claims about gays, gay couples, or
marriage. We exclude gay couples because what they want does not exist.
They are asking us to do the impossible. Indeed, to say they have been
"excluded" from anything makes no sense because one cannot be excluded
from the nonexistent. The definitional argument, above all, is clean.
C. Who Makes the Argument
Who makes the definitional argument? Certainly, common
citizens' first reaction to the idea of gay marriage is often the definitional
was. Unfortunately, in the past ten years, thanks to some 'more enlightened' state
supreme courts, no one is quite sure what marriage is anymore.").
"1 Jeffrey Ventrella, an attorney for the anti-gay-marriage Alliance Defense Fund who
tours the country speaking against gay marriage, prefers "square circle," though he also
likes "onion-less onion rings" and "married bachelors." Jeffrey J. Ventrella, Square
Circles?!! Restoring Rationality to the Same-Sex "Marriage" Debate, 32 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 681, 724 (2004-05).
[T]o advocate same-sex "marriage" is logically equivalent to seeking to
draw a "square circle": One may passionately and sincerely persist in
pining about square circles, but the fact of the matter is, one will never
be able to actually draw one.... The public square has no room for
square circles, because like the Tooth Fairy, they do not really exist.
Id. at 682-83.
12 Thanks to Stephen Clark for this formulation.
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one. Only after this initial reaction do people begin to think of other
reasons why only opposite-sex couples should be allowed to marry.
Early on, courts routinely made the definitional argument when
confronted with gay couples who initiated legal challenges against state
laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. 13 To some extent these
early courts seem to have been defining marriage for purposes of positive
law. They were construing state statutes that did not explicitly limit
marriage to one male and one female. But, faced with various federal and
state constitutional claims, these early courts' use of the definition seems
normative as well. For example, consider the reasoning of the Washington
State Appeals Court in Singer v. Hara, which rejected a state constitutional
claim for same-sex marriage based on a state constitutional provision
guaranteeing the equality of the sexes. 14 The court reasoned:
[t]here [was] no analogous sexual classification involved in
the instant case because [the] appellants [were] not being
denied entry into the marriage relationship because of their
sex; rather, they [were] being denied entry into the
marriage relationship because of the recognized definition
of that relationship as one which may be entered into only
by two persons who are members of the opposite sex. 15
A Kentucky appeals court similarly responsed to a same-sex marriage
claim: "[i]n substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is
not a marriage."'16 Both of these statements are classic examples of the
definitional argument: an assertion of the definition unaccompanied by any
substantive argument in defense of the definition.
17
13 See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Lewis v. Harris, 2003
WL 23191114 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
14Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197.
15 Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).
16 Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (emphasis added).
17 See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499,500-01 (1971) (citing the definition
of marriage from BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (4th ed. 1951)). "Marriage is the civil
status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the
discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose
2005]
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Academics have generally avoided the pure definitional argument,
especially of late. But there are glimpses of it in some academic
commentary, especially from natural-law theorists. 18 Professor Gerard
Bradley asserts that "[t]he law has never recognized any same-sex couples
as married because notwithstanding their subjective hopes, dreams, and
beliefs, marriage between a man and another man, or between two
women, is objectively impossible."'19 Professor Bradley wrote this
statement after "the law" recognized gay marriages in Belgium and the
Netherlands, and before "the law" recognized gay marriage in Spain,
Canada, and Massachusetts. 20 Saying that there is an "objective" male-
female reality to marriage that cannot be changed is like saying that there is
a single definition of marriage and that is that. Gay marriage is like table-
chair in this view; it literally makes no sense. So Professor Bradley
appears to be making something akin to the definitional argument.
However, Professor Bradley, like other natural-law theorists, has a
complicated-sounding explanation for why marriage can only be between a
man and a woman: "Marriage, being a two-in-one-flesh communion
oriented toward procreation, is available only to couples comprised of man
and woman." 21 Thus, he does attempt argumentative support for the
"objective" reality of male-female marriage, and to the extent he does, he
is not making the simple definitional argument. His argument for the
male-female definition, like that of other natural-law theorists, rests
heavily on the idea that marriage "is consummated and actualized by acts
of the reproductive type." 22 Though he might deny it, this argument is
closely related to the procreation argument discussed in Section II of this
article. So this natural-law argument may be closer to the bad procreation
association is founded on the distinction of sex." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1123
(Revised 4th ed. 1968).
1 See Gerard V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 189, 194 (2004).
19 Id. (emphasis added).2
1Id. at 194.
21 Id. at 194-95.
22 Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84
GEO. L.J. 301, 305 (1995).
[Vol. VII: 181
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argument discussed below than to the bad definitional argument now under
consideration.
But at the end of the day, many modem natural-law theorists seem
to rest on a kind of because-I-say-so reasoning that closely resembles, if it
does not replicate, the definitional argument.23 Professors Bradley and
Robert George argue that male-female marriage, and no other kind of
marriage, is a good in itself; it is not a good because it is instrumental to
the attainment of other goods, like pleasure, expressing feelings, or even
procreation. 24 Male-female marriage, and only male-female marriage, has
an "intrinsic value" that "cannot, strictly speaking, be demonstrated.
25
Hence, "if the intrinsic value of marriage... is to be affirmed, it must be
grasped in noninferential acts of understanding." 26 Some natural-law
theorists argue that this "noninferential understanding" that "cannot be
demonstrated" is simply unavailable to some people.2 7 They conclude that
"[i]n the end, one either understands that spousal genital intercourse has a
special significance as instantiating a basic, non-instrumental value, or
something blocks that understanding and one does not perceive
correctly. 28  This amounts to saying: "Same-sex marriage is not
'marriage' because only male-female marriage can be 'marriage.' Trust
me." The natural-law argument against same-sex marriage thus appears to
rest on the revelation of some pre-cognition reality to the initiate and only
to the initiate. This seems to me very close to saying that marriage is only
the union of one man and one woman and cannot, no matter the arguments,
be defined any other way.
D. Why the Argument is Bad
The obvious problem with the definitional argument, and the
reason it is rarely heard in intellectual circles, is that it suffers a very
23 id.
24 Id. at 301-02.
25 d. at 307.26 id.
27 id.
28 Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer?, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 729, 749 (2000).
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serious logical flaw: it is circular and conclusory. 29 In the gay-marriage
debate, it is the definition of marriage that is being challenged. Gay-
marriage advocates are saying, in effect, that the definition of marriage as
the union of one man and one woman is wrong, that it should be expanded
to include couples of the same sex, and that we have good reasons for this
expansion of the definition of marriage.
30
Given this challenge to the definition of marriage, the definition
alone cannot be offered in its own defense. It must be accompanied by
reasons that show why the male-female definition is the right or best one.
Unless the definition is defended with reasons that go beyond simply
asserting the definition itself, the defense suffers a fatal circularity. It
asserts the conclusion (the proper definition of marriage) as the argument.
It is the equivalent of saying, "I'm right because I say so." That reasoning
may work in a parent-child relationship, but it cannot suffice in a public-
policy debate.
31
Let's apply this lesson to the species-confusion analogies so
popular among gay-marriage opponents. Consider the dog-cat analogy
introduced above. Gay-marriage opponents argue that gay marriage is like
calling a "cat" a "dog," and that simply can't be, no matter how much we
want it to be. This misses the point of the gay marriage argument, which is
that gay couples, for multiple reasons, sufficiently meet the purposes of
marriage (properly understood) such that they should be permitted to
marry. To use the analogy, gay-marriage advocates argue that gay
marriage is indeed a "dog" that we have unfairly been calling a cat,
refusing to recognize it as a species of a dog. On this view, gay-marriage
advocates are not trying to get the world to accept cats as dogs, but to
29See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1183-84 (1999).
30 id.
31 The Hawaii Supreme Court has dismissed the definitional argument as "tautological and
circular" and an "exercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry." Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (concluding that the state marriage law excluding gay couples
must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the state constitution's equal rights provision).
Modem courts rejecting gay marriage have dropped the definitional argument, preferring
public-policy-based arguments against it. See e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2005).
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accept dogs as dogs. It is those persons who refuse to call this dog a dog
who are in error.
Maybe gay-marriage advocates are wrong on substance: perhaps
gay couples cannot meet the properly understood purposes of marriage,
and thus are like cats trying to pass as dogs. But that conclusion has to be
debated, with reasons offered for why gay couples can or cannot meet the
properly understood purposes of marriage. The conclusion cannot simply
be asserted once the existing definition is challenged.
A similar response applies to the various government benefits
analogies offered against gay marriage. Consider the analogy to veterans'
benefits, where gay-marriage opponents claim that gay couples are like
non-veterans trying to get veterans' benefits. Gay-marriage advocates are
arguing that, for multiple reasons, gay couples are "veterans," and that
denying them veterans' benefits is therefore wrong.
Similarly, when one side of the debate asserts that its conclusions
are justified by premises that "cannot be demonstrated" or that arise from
"noninferential understanding," we confront a dilemma. We cannot really
argue against these propositions because they are not arguments at all.
Rather, they are conclusions parading as arguments, thereby insulating
themselves from critique.32 Moreover, in debates, one often hears the
complaint from gay-marriage opponents that gays are trying to change the
definition of marriage. While this is true, it is hardly a decisive objection,
just as it would not be a decisive objection to any proposed change in
existing practices or laws.
I do not argue here that gay-marriage opponents are necessarily
wrong about what is the best definition of marriage. Nor do I argue that
marriage should be left undefined. There should be a definition of
marriage. But it must be debated. Perhaps the man-woman definition is
32 Others have given a much fuller reply to the natural-law versions of the
definitional/procreation arguments against gay marriage than I will attempt to do here.
See Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. JuRIs. 51
(1997); Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261
(1995).
2005]
Florida Coastal Law Review
the best one; but to reach that conclusion we need substantive arguments
supporting the definition (e.g., arguments about the welfare of children,
tradition, religion, etc.), not simply the definition itself.
II. THE PROCREATION ARGUMENT AGAINST GAY MARRIAGE
33
A. The Argument and its Variants
The procreation argument has both a crude form and a more
sophisticated form, but both forms reach the same demise. The crude form
can be stated this way: "Procreation is indispensable to human survival.
Marriage is for procreation. Procreation is the one essential attribute of
marriage, supplying the male-female definition. Gay couples cannot
procreate as a couple, so gay couples should not be allowed to marry."
34
The more sophisticated form of the procreation argument can be
put this way:
Well, what can man and woman do that man and man can
never do? ... persons of the same sex can never form a
mated pair, be the originators of human reproduction,
engage in sexual acts open to new life, have children who
are, literally, the embodiment of their two-in-one-flesh
union.... The procreative orientation of marriage makes
possible the awesome web of valuable relationships we call
the family.
35
This list of four things that "a man and a man can never do" all address the
same thing: they cannot procreate. The argument in this more
sophisticated form is softer: on this understanding, procreation is not an
absolute requirement of marriage, but an orientation of marriage.
33 The proceeding section is an expanded version of a blog entry by the author, which is
available at The Volokh Conspiracy website, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005
10 30-2005_11_05.shtml#1131027198 (Nov. 3, 2005, 09:13 EST).
3 Whiting, supra note 9, at 82-83 ("Needless to say, two people of the same sex cannot
procreate with each other. Consequently, the phrase 'gay marriage' is an oxymoron.").
35 Gerard V. Bradley, Stand and Fight: Don't take gay marriage lying down, 55 NAT'L
REv. 14 (2003).
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B. Why the Argument is Attractive
The procreation argument is appealing because it rings true
intuitively and experientially: procreation is indispensable to human
survival; encouraging procreation to occur within marriage has been a
primary purpose of marriage; and marriage is the normative situs for
procreation for many very good reasons, and ought to remain so. The
procreation argument makes the true factual claim that, given the present
state of technology, 36 same-sex couples cannot procreate as a couple.
While we may argue about the relative durability of gay and straight
relationships, about the fitness of gay couples to serve as parents, and
about the correct religious view on gay marriage, there is no argument that
all gay couples, as couples, are barren. The ability to procreate is the one
thing that indisputably separates same-sex couples from many opposite-sex
couples.37
Thus, the argument is attractive because its premises are either
indisputably true (e.g., human survival depends on procreation and only a
male-female couple can procreate) or find plausible support in empirical
research (e.g., children do best when they grow up with their married
biological parents). If the procreation argument is indeed right, it is
devastating to the cause of gay marriage.
C. Who Makes the Argument
The procreation argument enjoys great currency in academic and
legal discussions of gay marriage. Indeed, it is probably the most common
argument against gay marriage in these circles.38 Having long since
36 This is an interesting but unimportant qualification. It is interesting because one may
wonder in the abstract what would happen to this argument if gay couples could procreate
as a couple, becoming the two-in-one-flesh of natural law. It is unimportant because we
are nowhere near having the technology to allow two persons of the same sex, and them
alone, to produce a child.
37 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (making the point that
procreation is the one "unbridgeable gap" between homosexual and many heterosexual
couples).
38 See sources cited infra note 41.
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abandoned the definitional argument, all courts upholding the exclusion of
gay couples from marriage have relied to some extent on the procreation
argument, usually as the rational, though imperfect, state interest that
allows the state to exclude same-sex couples from statutory definitions of
marriage.
39
The procreation argument is most common of all among academic
opponents of gay marriage. 40 Indeed, it is difficult even to find a law
review article opposing gay marriage, on either constitutional or policy
grounds, that does not make the procreation argument.41
D. Why the Argument is Bad
Justice Scalia has rebutted the procreation argument as an adequateS 42
constitutional defense of traditional male-female marriage. As he wrote
in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, "[w]hat justification could there
possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples
exercising 'the liberty protected by the Constitution?' Surely not the
encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed
to marry.' 43 This dismissal of the procreation argument will undoubtedly
be quoted for years to come in the briefs of gay-marriage advocates.
Though Justice Scalia was addressing the question of the adequacy of the
39 Standhardt v. Super. Ct. Ariz., 77 P.3d 451,641 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); Lewis v. Harris
875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).40 See sources cited infra note 41.
41 Following is a partial list of articles making the procreation argument, by some of the
most prominent opponents of gay marriage: Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative
Argumentfor Proscribing Same-Sex Marriage, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653 (2004-05);
Ventrella, supra note 11, at 691; Bradley, supra note 20, at 196-200; William C. Duncan,
The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AvE MARIA L. REv. 153, 154-58, 165-71 (2004); Jane
Adolphe, The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage in Canada: Law and Policy
Considerations, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 479, 526-27, 529-41 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle,
"Multiply and Replenish ": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light ofState Interests in
Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771 (2001); Teresa Stanton Collett, 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1245, 1257-63 (1998); Robert P. George & Patrick Lee, What Sex Can Be:
Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 12 AM. J. JuRIS. 135, 142-48 (1997); John
Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation ", 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB.
POL'Y 11, 25-30 (1995).
42 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
43 Id. at 605 (Scalia dissenting).
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procreation argument for constitutional purposes, 44 his succinct rebuttal
applies with even more force when the procreation argument is used in
policy debates. The procreation argument is a mix of true claims, false
claims, and non sequiturs. It suffers logical flaws, experiential flaws, and
possibly political flaws.
The procreation argument, being the most common academic
argument against gay marriage, has generated many responses from gay-
marriage advocates. The back-and-forth over the procreation argument
between advocates and opponents of gay marriage follows a familiar and
somewhat tedious pattern. It goes something like this:
Thrust (by gay-marriage opponents): Marriage is for
procreation. Gay couples cannot procreate. Thus, gay
couples should not be allowed to marry.
Parry (by gay-marriage advocates): Procreation has never
been required for marriage, so the premise that "Marriage
is for procreation" is wrong, or at least incomplete. Sterile
couples, old couples, and couples who simply do not want
to procreate are all allowed to marry. Nobody objects to
their marriages, so nobody should on this ground object to
same-sex marriages.
Let's see if we can take the procreation argument beyond this familiar
thrust-and-parry. The procreation argument starts with the proposition that
procreation is indispensable to human survival. It then posits that marriage
exists to encourage this indispensable act to occur within a lasting union.
The procreationists may concede that marriage has other purposes, for
example, providing the married person with a primary caretaker and
channeling sexual activity into monogamous commitments. Still, the
procreationists maintain that these other purposes serve mainly to help
sustain the overarching marital purpose of encouraging procreation and
stabilizing family life for the resulting children.
4id.
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Individual gay persons can procreate, of course, through means
such as artificial insemination and surrogacy arrangements. But, as noted
by procreationists, they cannot procreate as a couple. According to the
procreationist argument, it is the unique procreative capacity of male-
female couples that justifies the unique status of marriage itself. It is the
one essential attribute of marriage, supplying its historic male-female
definition.
1. Practical Consequences to Procreation ofAdmitting Gay Couples
to Marriage
But what are the practical consequences to human procreation of
admitting gay couples to marriage? I can think of two possible fears. One
fear is that procreation itself would slow down, perhaps below the
replacement rate, the level at which humans must reproduce in order to
stay ahead of deaths. This slowdown would eventually imperil the
species.45 The other fear is that, as the connection between marriage and
procreation is loosened, procreation may increasingly occur outside of
46 4
marriage. Both could happen at once, and both would be bad.47
What do we make of these fears? If gay marriage would doom
human life on earth and/or result in significantly more children born to
unwed heterosexual couples, it should be resisted no matter how much gay
45 This has been a favorite argument of Maggie Gallagher. Gallagher, Does Sex Make
Babies?, 23 QLR 447, 456-65 (2004) (warning of the danger of a population implosion
for Western civilization). See also Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social
Institutions: Why and How Should the Law Support Marriage?, 18 NoTRE DAME J.L.
ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 225 (2004); Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? The Public
Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773,789 (2002) (one purpose of marriage is to
create children for the survival of the species). Professor Doug Kmiec has also noted
declining world population growth rates in connection with the procreation argument
against gay marriage. Kmiec, supra note 41, at 658 ("The potential procreative harm of
recognizing same-sex marriage is also magnified because the rate of world population
growth has declined by more than 40% since the late 1960s.").
46 Gallagher, Does Sex Make Babies?, supra note 45, at 465-71 (stating that traditional
marriage encourages a link between procreation and marriage).47 Id. (traditional marriage encourages a link between procreation and marriage); William
C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law?, 15 REGENT U. L. REv. 119, 125 (2002-03)
(gay marriage "would automatically remove the link between marriage and procreation").
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couples want or need marriage. The cost would simply be too high for the
expected benefit.
But neither of these consequences seems plausible. Start with the
fear of a population implosion. How would allowing gay couples to wed
cause a decline in rates of procreation? It is not clear why straight couples
would stop procreating, or even procreate less, if gay couples could marry.
The factors driving people to reproduce, such as religious obligations, the
instinct to propagate one's genes, and the need to be loved and to love
another, would all still exist if Adam and Steve could marry. That is,
procreation will likely continue unaffected by whether gay couples are
permitted to marry. If Western civilization is truly facing a population
implosion, as some suggest, that is attributable to many factors other than
gay marriage. 48
Here is one possible mechanism arising from gay marriage that
might lead to population decline. Professor Douglas Kmiec, quoting
Robert Bork, has argued that gay marriage "'will lead to an increase in the
number of homosexuals.""' 9 More homosexuals means less procreation,
the theory goes. But even if it is true that increasing the number of
homosexuals would result in significantly less procreation, the idea that the
incidence of homosexuality in a society varies with the degree of legal
repression or acceptance of homosexuality has no empirical support.
50
Homosexual preference appears to be no more common in tolerant
societies than in repressive societies. 5' The reason for this is clear. "The
formation of homosexual preference, at least in males, appears to be deeply
rooted in genetic, hormonal, and (or) developmental factors unlikely to be
offset by purely social influences."
52
In support of the idea that gay marriage will increase the number of
homosexuals, Professor Kmiec notes that the Census Bureau reported a
large increase of same-sex households during the 1990s, a period of
48 Declining infant mortality and rising costs of having and raising children are significant
factors. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 195 (1992).
49 Kmiec, supra note 41, at 661.50 See POSNER, supra note 48, at 163, 296-97.
51 See id. at 296.
52 Id. at 163.
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increasing acceptance for homosexuals.5 3 But this statistic does not
support his claim that the incidence of homosexuality is actually
increasing. Some of this increase is due to a change in the way the Census
Bureau counted same-sex couples. In 2000, any same-sex couple in which
the partner was identified as either a "husband/wife" or "unmarried
partner" was coded as an "unmarried partner" to account for mistakes. But
in 1990, same-sex "husbands" and "wives" had their sex changed so that
the couple was counted as a heterosexual married couple. This means that
same-sex partners included in the 2000 Census (same-sex "married"
couples) were not included in the 1990 Census. These and other
differences in counting same-sex couples have led the Census Bureau to
conclude that "estimates of same-sex unmarried partners are not
comparable between the 1990 and 2000 Census (sic)." 54 Additionally, the
jump in the number of reported same-sex households likely reflects a
greater willingness of gay couples to report their cohabitation (an effect of
easing anti-gay stigma), an effort by gay groups to encourage such
reporting, and a larger number of homosexuals who live as couples, rather
than an increase in the number or proportion of individual homosexuals.
Perhaps, the procreationist might conjecture, there are some
"waverers"-people who stand somewhere between homosexuality and
heterosexuality-who will be brought toward more homosexual behavior by
the stigma-easing effect of permitting gay marriage. These waverers might
then engage in less procreative sex than they otherwise would. I have three
responses to the possibility of waverers as a cause of population implosion.
First, we have no evidence that there are serious waverers who are brought
into homosexual or heterosexual orientation by government policy. 55 It is
53 Kmiec, supra note 41, at 661.
54 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVIsION, FERTILITY & FAMILY STATISTICS
BRANCH, TECHNICAL NOTE ON SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER DATA FROM THE 1990
AND 2000 CENSUSES (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/population
/www/cen2000/samesex.html.
55 Posner writes:
No one as far as I know has suggested, let alone presented evidence,
that the removal of legal disabilities to homosexuality in countries such
as Sweden and the Netherlands, and the growth of social tolerance to
which that removal must in large part have been due, caused the
number of homosexuals to increase.
POSNER, supra note 48, at 297; see also id. at 297-99.
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true that there are people for whom homosexual activity is an adequate
substitute for heterosexual sex under certain conditions and
circumstances.56 When gay marriage is permitted, they will probably
engage in more homosexual activity. But, there is no reason to believe
their basic orientation will change or that they will give up all heterosexual
activity. 57  Homosexuals are not created by recruitment, seduction,
example, or propaganda.58 Second, even if there are serious waverers
whose basic orientation is sensitive to government and social incentives,
some of these waverers would have ended up in gay relationships anyway.
Third, it is doubtful there are enough waverers to make any difference in
rates of reproduction. At any rate, there is no evidence to support that fear.
Thus, since homosexual orientation seems invariant to legal
sanction, gay marriage should not affect the number of homosexuals in a
society. What seems more likely is that when gay marriage is allowed
more homosexuals will be open about their homosexuality, resulting in the
appearance that there are more homosexuals. Further, closeted
homosexuals will be less likely to enter unhappy and unstable marriages
with partners of the opposite sex. While a lower number of marriages
between closeted homosexuals and their heterosexual spouses may mean
fewer children from such marriages, it will also free up their heterosexual
spouses to seek marriageable partners with whom they can procreate and
form more lasting relationships. The resulting reduction in the number of
sham marriages has the potential to be good for procreation rates and good
for marriage as a whole, not bad.
Moreover, gay marriage may actually encourage more net
procreation in two ways. It is true that gay couples cannot procreate as a
couple, so they are less likely than a heterosexual couple to fulfill the state
interest in encouraging procreation.59 However, gay couples in a marriage
may be more likely to seek surrogacy and artificial means of procreating
than gay couples who cannot marry.60 Because the higher degree of legal
56 Id. at 298.
57 Id.
8 Id. at 299.
59 Duncan, supra note 41, at 154-57.
60 See Anne M. Burton, Gay Marriage--A Modern Proposal: Applying Baehr v. Lewin to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
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protection and social acceptance accompanying marriage may make such
couples feel more secure about the durability of their relationship and
about their ability to raise children in a secure legal and social
environment, gay marriage may fuel the already growing baby boom
among gay parents, sometimes called the "gayby boom." 61 Additionally,
heterosexuals freed from sham marriages may also procreate more than
they would have with closeted gay spouses; presumably, truly heterosexual
spouses will enjoy procreative sex more than closeted gay partners would
have, and so will engage in it more often.
I do not claim that this additional amount of procreation (from gay
couples and heterosexual spouses spared sham marriages) will reverse,
much less offset, the many complex factors that are leading to lower rates
of reproduction in the West. My only claim is that gay marriage will not
intensify those trends, and may perhaps even put a small dent in them.
Even if gay couples do not procreate, however, same-sex marriage
may enrich society in other ways, such as by causing the individuals who
marry to settle down and by assisting them in raising children they acquire
through adoption, surrogacy, or artificial insemination of one of the
partners. Furthermore, rather than severing the link between procreation
and marriage as a normative matter, gay marriage might help reinforce the
idea that the proper environment for raising children-something that at
least 162,000 gay couples in the United States are doing62-is within
marriage. 6
3
177, 183 (1995).
61 Christopher Carnahan, Inscribing Lesbian and Gay Identities: How Judicial
Imaginations Intertwine with the Best Interests of Children, 11 CARDOzO WOMEN'S L.J. 1
(2004).
62 Census 2000 Special Reports, Married-Couple and Unmarried-Partner Households:
2000, at 11 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
Even this number probably undercounts the real number, since gay-couple respondents to
the 2000 Census had to self-report their status as "unmarried partners" rather than as
"roommates" or "boarders" in order to be counted. Additionally, it does not count the
numbers of gay couples raising children who do not live in the same household.
63 JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS,
AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004).
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It is also not clear why gay marriage would drive more straight
couples to reproduce outside of marriage. After all, the benefits of marital
procreation would still be available to them and the problems of non-
marital procreation (e.g. less likelihood of support from a partner) would
still be there to discourage it. Professor Kmiec suggests that gay marriage
might encourage non-marital procreation by bolstering "public acceptance
of heterosexual cohabiting relations outside of marriage which
independently have exploded in number."64 However, there is no reason to
believe that heterosexual couples model themselves on what homosexual
couples do or do not do. To the extent that heterosexual couples look to
homosexual role models at all, allowing their homosexual role models to
marry-rather than simply to cohabit, as they do now because they cannot
marry-would seem to strengthen the norm of marriage. A married
homosexual couple is a rebuke to the idea that simply cohabiting is the
optimal way to structure a relationship.
65
But fortunately there is no need to guess at the probability of these
cataclysmic consequences because society already has much experience
with a world in which there is no requirement to procreate within
marriage.66 No couple has ever been required to procreate in order to
marry. Nor has any couple ever been required to be able to procreate in
order to marry. Sterile couples and old couples can marry. Couples
physically able to procreate, but who do not want to procreate, can get
married.
64 Kmiec, supra note 41, at 661.
65 Stanley Kurtz has argued that "gay marriage" has led to a number of social pathologies
in Scandinavia, including more out-or-wedlock births. Stanley Kurtz, The End of
Marriage in Scandinavia, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 2, 2004. This thesis has been
carefully rebutted. See M. V. Lee Badgett, Will Providing Marriage Rights to Same-Sex
Couples Undermine Heterosexual Marriages? Evidence From Scandinavia and the
Netherlands (July 2004) (discussion paper prepared for the Council on Contemporary
Families and Institute for Gay and Lesbian Studies), available at
http://www.iglss.org/media/files/briefing.pdf; William N. Eskridge, Darren R. Spedale &
Hans Ytterberg, Nordic Bliss? Scandinavian Registered Partnerships and the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, IssuEs IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2004), available at
www.bepress.com/ils/iss5/art4/.66 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Gay Marriage and Procreation, BAY AREA REPORTER (Mar.
18, 2004), available at http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/carpenter/carpenter43.html.
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Millions of married opposite-sex couples already fit into one of
these non-procreative categories. According to the National Center for
Health Statistics, "[a]bout 2.3 million marriedcouples with wives aged 15-
44 years were infertile in 1988-7.9 percent or slightly less than 1 in 12 [of
such married couples].'67 About 1.1 million married couples with wives
aged 15-44 were childless and had "impaired fecundity"--impossibility or
near impossibility of conception. That represents 3.9% of all married
couples with wives 15-44 years old.68 An additional 636,000 couples with
the wife in the age 15-44 range were childless and were surgically sterile-
via tubal ligation, hysterectomy, and/or vasectomy. 69 That represents 2.2%
of all married couples with wives in that age range. 70 Thus,just over 6%
of all married couples of child-bearing age have no children and are
incapable or practically incapable of having children. This figure does
not include those among the remaining married couples of child-bearing
age who are childless, do not wish to have children, and take precautions,
like using contraceptives, to avoid it. Together, these non-procreative
categories of childless married couples already constitute a much larger
segment of the married population than gay married couples ever could.
Yet despite these childless married couples' inherent or explicit rejection
of the putative marital duty to procreate, humans continue to procreate and
marriage continues to be the normative situs for procreation.
2. The Sterility Objection: Three Responses and Counter-Responses
The procreationists have three potential responses to the "sterility
objection," the argument that marriage is not limited to couples who
procreate and this cannot be the basis for excluding gay couples from
marriage. First, they say that laws are made for the general rule, not the
67 WILLLAM D. MOSHER & WILLIAM F. PRATr, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FECUNDITY AND FERTILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1965-88, 1 (1990), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad192.pdf. "Infertility" is defined by physicians as
"inability to conceive after 12 months or more of" unprotected intercourse. Id.6 1id. at4.
69 Id. An astonishing 42.4% of all married couples where the wives' ages range from 15-
44 are surgically sterile. Id. This figure includes married couples who have already had
children and have elected, for various reasons, to surgically prevent further conception.70 id.
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exceptions.71 Most opposite-sex couples can reproduce, but no gay couple
can. Second, they argue that the failure to require married couples to
procreate is only a concession to the impracticality and intrusiveness of
imposing an actual procreation requirement.72 The procreationists claim
that there has been no abandonment of the procreation principle itself, but
contend that it would be unthinkable, on privacy grounds alone, to subject
couples to fertility tests as a requirement for marriage.73 In contrast, the
procreationists observe, no such intrusive test is necessary with same-sex
couples to determine that they cannot reproduce.74 Third, some
procreationists argue that even sterile male-female couples can engage in
sexual acts of a reproductive type (penile-vaginal sex), even if the acts
themselves are not reproductive. 75 Again, in contrast, same-sex couples
cannot engage in reproductive-type acts because their sexual activity lacks
either a participating penis or vagina.
The first response to the sterility objection--that laws are made for
the general rule-is an evasion. Laws often state general rules while
providing exceptions where appropriate andjust. Gay marriage, like non-
procreative straight marriage, might be an appropriate and just exception to
the procreationists' general rule that marriage exists for procreation.
Whether gay marriage is an appropriate and just exception to the general
rule that marriage is for procreation depends upon arguments extrinsic to
the procreation argument, e.g., whether encouraging stable gay coupling
through marriage would benefit society.
71 See Ventrella, supra note 11, at 704 (quoting Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604,
608 (7th Cir. 2001)).72 E.g., Kmiec, supra note 41, at 656 ("It would be highly intrusive of privacy for the state
to inquire of heterosexual couples to determine if they are disinclined toward procreation
or infertile .... "); Jay Allen Sekulow & JohnTuskey, Sex and Sodomy and Apples and
Oranges - Does the Constitution Require States to Grant a Right to Do the Impossible?,
12 BYU J. PuB. L. 309, 317 (arguing that it would be an "incredible intrusion into a
couple's legitimate privacy" to require that couple to prove their fertility before their
marriage will be recognized).
73 Sekulow & Tuskey, supra note 72, at 317.74 ld. at 326.
75 E.g., George & Lee, supra note 41, at 150.
2005] Carpenter
Florida Coastal Law Review
Society already has experience with making exceptions to the
general rule of procreation, and gay marriage may be just one more such
exception to the general rule. Besides allowing non-procreative couples to
marry, two states (Wisconsin and Arizona) allow certain classes of people
(first cousins) to marry only if they cannot procreate.76 In these states the
law not only does not require procreation in marriage, but it actually
dictates to some people that they must not procreate in order to marry.
Obviously those states have an overriding state interest in this regulation:
the prevention of any birth defects that might result in the children of first-
cousin marriages.77 The danger of birth defects is not an objection to
same-sex marriages; but if the state has interests in recognizing non-
procreative opposite-sex marriages that outweigh the societal interests in
marital procreation, why wouldn't other overriding state interests apply to
the recognition of the non-procreative marriages of gay couples?
The second response to the sterility objection-that a procreation
requirement for straight couples would be unduly intrusive-is equally
unavailing. If society was serious about the procreationist project,
prospective married couples could be required to sign an affidavit stating
that they are able to procreate and intend to do so.7 8 No fertility test would
be needed. If, say, in ten years a couple had not procreated, it could be
presumed that they are either unable or unwilling to bear children, and the
marriage could be dissolved as unworthy of that unique institution. That
would be neither impractical nor require invasive fertility examinations.
Yet society would never require opposite-sex couples to fill out
such fertility forms. Most people would scoff at the idea. But why? They
would scoff at the idea because marriage today is not understood to be
essentially about procreation, although procreation within marriage is
important. Marriage is understood today to have other important functions
76 ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(B) (2004); Wis. STAT. § 765.03(1) (2005).
77 But see Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 337, 352
(2004) (noting that the risk of birth defects in first-cousin marriages is very low). The
states have a variety of approaches to first-cousin marriages, and some do not prohibit
such marriages at all. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A- 13-3 Commentary (2005) (noting that first
cousin marriages are forbidden in some states, but are not forbidden by Alabama law).
78 Under this approach, couples in which the woman was past child-bearing age would be
barred from marrying altogether.
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and purposes, such as recognizing a couple's mutual love and supporting
their commitment to one another.79 Here the procreation argument suffers
an experiential flaw; it is like an argument from another world, not the
world we inhabit in which procreation is an important but not an essential
attribute of marriage. This may also expose a potential political flaw in the
procreation argument: by repeatedly emphasizing the importance of
procreation in marriage, opponents of gay marriage run the risk of
demeaning the many married couples for whom procreation is either
unwanted or physically impossible.
That no one opposed to gay marriage has proposed this simple
expedient of a fertility form, or anything remotely like it, suggests that
even they do not take the narrow procreationist vision of marriage very
seriously. Marriage is not essentially about procreation because
procreation is not essential to any marriage, or to anyone really concerned
about marriage as an institution.
Furthermore, this second response to the sterility objection suggests
that the general rule of procreation must bend, first to the overriding needs
and interests of society in helping individuals to settle down, and second,
to the interests of the couples unable or unwilling to live by the procreation
purpose. If that exception exists for non-procreative straight couples, why
does it not exist for non-procreative gay couples? If there is an answer to
this question it cannot be found in the procreation argument.
The third response to the sterility objection--that even non-
procreative straight couples can engage in "reproductive-type" sexual
acts 8 0 _4s associated with the natural-law arguments against gay marriage.
79 See Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 291, 310 (2001) (stating that people marry for "love and commitment,"
not only for legal benefits).
80 E.g., John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some
Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97, 126-29 (1997) (noting
that sterile married couples can engage in acts "of the reproductive kind," while
homosexual couples cannot); George & Lee, supra note 41, at 150 & n.29. The authors
assert:
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It is form over substance. At bottom it amounts to the truism that a male-
female couple is anatomically different from a male-male or female-female
couple, and therefore, the couples differ in terms of the sexual acts the
partners can perform on one another. An opposite-sex couple can have
penile-vaginal sex, while a same-sex couple cannot. This is true, but it is
irrelevant for purposes of the procreation argument if the opposite-sex
couple is just as sterile as the same-sex couple. Simply asserting the
anatomical difference by dressing it up as "reproductive-type" sex is to rest
on the definitional argument discussed above. Natural-law theorists who
claim that penile-vaginal sexual acts are superior to other sexual acts, and
therefore they alone merit marriage, whether or not the acts are even
capable of resulting in procreation, are asserting a conclusion rather than
making an argument.
My friend Professor Teresa Stanton Collett has an interesting
variation on this third response to the sterility objection. She argues that
even a sterile opposite-sex union "joins intrinsically different
individuals,"-"a male and a female." 81 She continues, "[w]hile same-sex
unions contain some diversity, in that they involve two unique and
distinctive persons, the differences are individual rather than inherent."
82
This lack of "intrinsic" difference between same-sex partners "weaken[s]
the union in the same manner that similarly formed pieces joined by
adhesive are less durably connected than interlocking pieces of the same
material joined by the same adhesive." 83
If a married couple become sterile, this does not change what they have
been doing in bed: they still perform the same kind of act they have
been doing perhaps for years.... The heterosexual couple who engage
in a reproductive-type act truly become one body, one organism....
[H]omosexual partners cannot form the kind of personal communion
with each other which is embodied by reproductive-type acts; nor can
they perform with each a reproductive-type act, that is their sexual acts
do not unite them biologically.
Id. See also Ventrella, supra note 11, at 715 ("even absent fertility, the intimate acts of
opposite sex couples remain reproductive in type, thereby reinforcing the pedagogical
function of law").
81 Collett, supra note 41, at 1261-62.82Id. at 1262.
83 Id.
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This jigsaw puzzle analogy is creative, but ultimately unpersuasive.
First, it is unclear why marriage must necessarily join important
differences. Marriages between people who share important common
characteristics may be the most durable of all and may still contribute not
only to the health of society, but also to the well-being of the married
couple and any children they raise. Second, it is unclear why the
differences joined by marriage must be "intrinsic" rather than contingent or
"individual." Men and women are different from each other in myriad
ways. However, as Professor Collett recognizes, so are any two men or
any two women.84 Two men from different racial, ethnic, geographic, or
economic backgrounds may have much less in common than a man and a
woman from the same racial, geographic, and economic background.
Third, it is unclear why the differences between two men or two women
joined in marriage cannot be considered "inherent" differences, arising
from inborn variations that affect thought, emotion, and behavior just as
deeply as gender does. Fourth, to the extent two men or two women are
inherently less "different" from each other than a man and a woman, it is
unclear why this fact would weaken their union rather than strengthen it.
Perhaps their common outlook on life will give them a bond that no
opposite-sex couple could have. Fifth, and finally, even if the inherent
commonality of same-sex couples would weaken their union in some way,
this would appear to be an argumentfor gay marriage rather than against it.
After all, a weaker bond has greater need for the "adhesive" marriage
provides than does a relatively stronger bond.
Thus, the responses to the sterility objection to the procreation
argument fail as a matter of logic, or experience, or both. The procreation
argument, refined in light of actual experience, amounts to this: nobody is
required to procreate in order to marry, except gay couples, who
unfortunately cannot procreate, and so cannot marry. This is a rule made
to reach a predetermined conclusion, rather than for good reasons.
84id.
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III. THE POLYGAMY SLIPPERY-SLOPE ARGUMENT AGAINST GAY
MARRIAGE
85
A. The Argument and Its Variants
Slippery-slope arguments offer a parade of horribles that might be
brought about by gay marriage, but they always take this form: "If we
allow gay marriage, we will also have to allow [policy X], which would
unquestionably be bad., 86 The usual bad destination claimed to await us
after gay marriage is polygamy, but one occasionally hears that gay
marriage will also bring incestuous marriages, bestial marriages (humans
marrying dogs, horses, or other animals), adult-child marriages, and
marriages between humans and inanimate objects.87 Here only the
polygamy variant of the slippery-slope argument is discussed, but the
analysis applies equally to the other variants.
Slippery slopes can be initiated in one of two ways: 1) the logic of
the proposed step entails a slide down the slope; or 2) the politics of the
proposed step, e.g., in terms of the way in which the step might change
public attitudes about further reform, risks a slide down the slope. This
article addresses only the logical slide to polygamy because this is how
most gay-marriage opponents present the slippery-slope argument.
The political, or attitude-altering, slide has been addressed in some
detail by Professor Eugene Volokh.88 Briefly, I think the political slide to
polygamy is very unlikely. There would simply be no political coalition for
85 The proceeding section is an expanded version of a blog entry by the author, which is
available at The Volokh Conspiracy website, http://volokh.com/posts/1 130982815.shtml
(Nov. 2, 2005, 20:53 EST).86 See Tobin A. Sparling, All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying Potential of Same-
Sex Marriage, 10 LAW & SExuALITY 187, 197 (2001).
87 Note that opponents of gay marriage sometimes warn that gay marriage will lead to
more than recognition of another, and undesirable, type of marriage. One opponent,
George Dent, has argued that gay marriage will lead to baby-selling, polygamy,
endogamy, bestiality, and child marriage. George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional
Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 633-37 (1999).
8 8 See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 34 HOFsTRA L. REv.
(forthcoming 2006) (draft on file with author).
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polygamy after gay marriage. As Volokh notes, the right would not like it;
the left would be split over the issue by concern for sex equality. Overall,
polygamy has very dim prospects, especially in the West, where liberal
individualism, sex equality, the loss of religious adherents, and the
opposition by Christianity, all combine to make it a very rare and dying
practice.89
Slippery-slope arguments must be scrutinized with care because the
public often believes them and because they divert attention from the core
issue: whether gay marriage itself would be a good or bad thing.
B. Why the Argument is Attractive
The slippery-slope argument is attractive for three reasons. First, it
takes the focus off gay people, so it appeals to those uncomfortable with
attacking gays. One does not have to believe anything bad about gay
people to think polygamy is a bad idea and so one may, by accepting a
polygamy slippery slope argument, oppose gay marriage for the neutral
reason that polygamy is bad. Second, it is an argument of last resort,
available when all other arguments have failed. Even if the gay-marriage
opponent has been unsuccessful in persuading the listener to fear that
something bad will happen if same-sex marriages are recognized, only a
tiny minority of people think polygamy is a swell idea. Third, the slippery-
slope argument makes some gay-marriage advocates uncomfortable
because it puts them in the position of either accepting the destination that
awaits following the slide down the slippery slope (in this case, polygamy)
or arguing that other people, like polygamists, are not entitled to marry.
The first response is politically untenable for the gay-marriage movement,
but some gay-marriage advocates have opted for it.90 The second response
89 See David R. Dow & Jose I. Maldonado, Commentary, How Many Spouses Does the
Constitution Allow One to Have? 20 CONST. COMMENT. 571, 572 (2004).
90 See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447, 489-91 (1996)
(cautioning that gay-marriage advocates, in challenging the "romantically linked man-
woman couple," should respect those who argue against the hegemony of the two person
marital unit). Professor Chambers also finds no logical reason why marriage laws cannot
equally serve units of more than two persons. Id. See also JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME
OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE 126,127 (1996).
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seems contrary to the strong egalitarian and individualistic impulses of
many in the gay civil rights movement. Although the polygamy slippery-
slope argument is one of the worst arguments against gay marriage on
logical and experiential grounds, it is often the most effective on rhetorical
and political grounds.
C. Who Makes the Argument
The polygamy argument is a staple of anti-gay-marriage arguments.
Sometimes it is a featured argument, at other times it is added on toward
the end of a longer series of arguments, almost as an afterthought. Either
way, it is hard to find an opponent of gay marriage who has not heaved
polygamy on the table. 91
D. Why the Argument is Bad
9 2
To see why the slippery-slope argument is so bad, it is necessary to
attempt to understand some possible bases for it. Slippery-slope arguments
warning of a logical slide take the following form: "Proposal X contains
within it a principle. That principle not only supports Proposal X but
would also support Proposal Y. An honest person supporting Proposal X
must therefore also support Proposal Y. While Proposal X may or may not
be bad in itself, Proposal Y would surely be very bad. So to avoid
adopting Proposal Y, we must not adopt Proposal X." Substitute "gay
9' See generally Bradley, supra note 18, at 198,208-10; George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional
Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 419,441-42 (2004); Duncan, supra
note 41, at 125; Finnis, supra note 41, at 132-33; Gallagher, What is Marriage For?,
supra note 47, at 775; Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to
Legitimate a Retreat From Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 735,
760 (1998); Whiting, supra note 8, at 84.
92 Professor Eugene Volokh dealt with the various slippery-slope arguments against gay
marriage and concluded, "Slippery slope risks are real risks, in this area as well as in
others. We shouldn't exaggerate them but neither should we pooh-pooh them." Volokh,
supra note 88, at 18. He also concluded that gay marriage will make the possibility of
polygamous marriage increase from "minuscule to merely very small." Id at 40. Perhaps
a more accurate statement of the risk identified by Professor Volokh is that gay marriage
would make the likelihood of polygamy increase from minuscule to almost minuscule.
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marriage" for Proposal X and "polygamous marriage" for Proposal Y and
you have a slippery-slope argument against gay marriage.
There are three possible stock responses to every slippery-slope
argument. First, one might argue that the supposedly horrible
destination(s) at the bottom of the slope are not so bad, so there is no need
to fear the slide. Second, one could argue that the slope slides both ways,
so that if the proposed step is not taken, there is a danger of sliding down
the other side of the policy hill, which would be equally bad. Third, one
could argue that there will be no slide down the slippery slope if the
proposed step is taken because the proposed reform does not require
embracing an idea that leads to slippage, and thus there is a principled
stopping point that prevents a slide to the bottom of the slope.
In the gay-marriage debate, the first stock response would involve
arguing that polygamy is unobjectionable. This is an unattractive reply for
political reasons-polygamy enjoys no popular support--and for
experiential/historical reasons that are explained below in connection with
the third response.
The second stock response would involve claiming that if gay
marriage is rejected, there is nothing to stop the prohibition of other
marriages, such as those involving people of different races or infertile
people. This second response is the kind of argument lawyers love to
make, but is not likely to impress many people as a reason to support
same-sex marriage. It seems very unlikely that rejecting gay marriage will
send us back to the days of anti-miscegenation laws.
It is the third response-that there is a principled stopping point
preventing the slide toward polygamy--that best refutes the slippery-slope
argument. The argument for gay marriage is indeed an argument for
liberalization of marriage-entrance rules. But it is not necessarily a call to
open marriage to anyone and everyone, any more than the fight against
anti-miscegenation laws was a call to open marriage to anyone and
everyone. So in formulating the principled stopping point, it is necessary
to question why the recognition of a new form of monogamous marriage
would lead to the revival of polygamous marriage, which has been rejected
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in most societies that once practiced it. What is "the principle" supporting
gay marriage that would lead to acceptance of multi-partner marriage?
1. Non-Procreation as the Principle Logically Uniting Gay Marriage
and Polygamous Marriage
One principle possibly seen as uniting gay marriage and
polygamous marriage is that gay marriage, like polygamous marriage,
extends marriage beyond partners who may procreate as partners. By
removing the gender requirement from marriage, this argument goes: gay
marriage would sever the link between marriage and procreation. If there
is no link between marriage and procreation, then all non-procreative
arrangements, like polygamous marriages, which cannot form children
from all of the partners, will have to be recognized. On this view, marriage
must be two-person because only couples can create babies together.
Moreover, that couple must be man-woman, because same-sex pairings
cannot make babies together. There is thus a teleological defense of one
man/one woman marriage. Once a part of that teleological defense is
stripped away (the opposite-sex requirement), there is no logical,
principled basis for retaining the other part of it (the two-person
requirement). As Professor Hadley Arkes put it, "[i]f marriage is detached
from that 'natural teleology of the body,' on what ground of principle
could the law rule out the people who profess that their own love is not
confined to a coupling of two, but woven together in a larger ensemble of
three or four?' 93 This emphasis on the slippery-slope consequences of
losing the marriage-procreation link is especially prominent among
natural-law writers,94 although it is also employed by others.95
The notion that gay marriage fundamentally severs the link between
procreation and marriage, and thus leads to polygamy, founders on the
same logical and experiential shoals as does the procreation argument
discussed above. Procreation is not a requirement of marriage. Sterile
93 Hadley Arkes, A Culture Corrupted, 67 FIRST THINGS 30-33 (1996).94 See e.g., Bradley, supra note 18, at 194-95; Finnis, supra note 41, at 126-27, 129-32.
95 See Duncan, supra note 41, at 125 (arguing that removing the gender element from
marriage, which automatically removes the marriage-procreation link, would "open the
door" to recognition of polygamous unions).
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opposite-sex couples have already taken that step down the slope for us,
yet society seems no closer to accepting polygamy as a result. Therefore,
in terms of their non-procreativity, gay married couples will take society no
further down the slope to polygamy than sterile opposite-sex couples
already have.
The potential for procreation is a good reason to permit, indeed to
encourage, fertile opposite-sex couples to marry. But it is not a good
reason to refuse to permit, and even to encourage, sterile couples (gay or
straight) to marry. The teleological defense of man-woman marriage is
thus a fine account of why fertile heterosexuals marry; but it is not
necessarily a critique of other marriages. The teleological account fails to
acknowledge that recognizing infertile marriages has already "detached"
marriage from the "natural teleology of the body," with no apparent slide
toward polygamy in sight.
2. Sexual Autonomy as the Principle Logically Uniting Gay Marriage
and Polygamous Marriage
A second possible principle uniting gay marriage and polygamy is
that accepting gay marriage means accepting a very broad and general right
of sexual autonomy, under which many forms of unions must also be
recognized, including polygamous unions, no matter how socially harmful
they are. 96 But is the movement for gay marriage a movement for sexual
liberation? Certainly many gay-marriage opponents see it as precisely that.
As supporting evidence, they can point to statement by some gay-marriage
advocates who speak in such terms, describing the gay marriage cause as
an effort to free marriage from traditional expectations, like monogamy.
Yet as perceptive sexual liberationists have observed, marriage is
antithetical to such liberation. 97 Marriage channels sex into forms and
requirements regulated by the state, even as it implicitly disapproves of
96 Dent, supra note 91, at 440-43 (asserting that the reasons advanced by advocates in
support of gay marriage apply equally to polygamy, incest, bestiality, and adultery).97 MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NoRMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF
QUEER LIFE 90 (First Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1999).
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non-marital sexual intimacies. 98 While sexual autonomy may demand the
end of sodomy laws and other sexual regulation, it hardly requires legal
approval in the form of marriage. The cause of gay marriage is practically
the opposite of the sexual liberation.
3. The Absence of "Public Purpose" as the Principle Logically
Uniting Gay Marriage and Polygamous Marriage
A third possible uniting principle is that gay marriage necessarily
makes marriage a private affair, catering to the wants and needs of private
adult citizens, rather than an institution with a profound public purpose,
like ensuring the rearing of the next generation. The argument goes, if
marriage is a private matter, then the state has no business regulating entry
to it, so polygamous groups cannot be denied marriage. 99 This supposed
uniting principle also misconceives the argument for gay marriage, which,
as discussed below, is not based solely on augmenting the happiness of two
same-sex adults. Furthermore, using marriage to recognize adult love is a
step down the slope already taken by straight couples. For more than a
century in the West, marriage has been companionate, rooted in the
romantic love and commitment of the spouses.100 Among straight (and
gay) couples, children are a common and important, but not a necessary
part of the relationship. So even if gay marriage is justified solely by the
love same-sex partners have for one another, recognizing such
relationships is more analogous to taking a step to one side on a slope
already partially descended, rather than an additional step down the slope.
98 Id.
99 See Gallagher, supra note 45, at 775 (noting that under the "relationship view" of
marriage law, where the marriage is said to be created by and for the couple, the state
would have no right to impose one form of family and, therefore, consensual polygamy
would be a viable option).
1oo See, e.g., Shannon Alexander & Heather Schafer, Defense of Marriage Act: Amend
the Constitution of the State of Georgia to Provide That Georgia Shall Recognize As
Marriage Only the Union of a Man and a Woman; Provide for Submission of This
Amendment for Ratification or Rejection; andfor Other Purposes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
14, 27 (2004) (defining marriage as "love, commitment and a contract between two
people").
[Vol. VII: 181
Carpenter
4. The Principled Stopping Point Preventing a Logical Slide to
Polygamy
If, as some gay-marriage supporters claim,'10 gay couples must be
allowed to marry simply because they love each other, there is indeed no
principled reason to reject multi-partner marriages; multiple partners in a
relationship are capable of loving each other.
But satisfying individual needs is not "the principle"--at least not
the only principle, and not by itself a sufficient principle-supporting the
recognition of gay marriage. Instead, any proposal for the expansion of
marriage must be good both for the individuals involved (individualistic
reasons) and for the society in which they live (communitarian reasons).
Gay marriage is a good idea for both individualistic and communitarian
reasons. The case for polygamous marriage is distinguishable (and
weaker) on both counts, especially the second.
a. The Individualistic Distinction Between Gay Marriage and
Polygamy
On the first issue-4he effect of recognition on the individuals
involved-the deprivation to gays by the gay marriage ban is even greater
than the deprivation to polygamists by the polygamy ban. A polygamist
may still marry someone if polygamy is banned, he simply may not marry
many someones. The deprivation to the polygamist is admittedly large,
especially if polygamy involves the exercise of his religious faith, but it is
not a total deprivation. The gay person, however, has no realistic choice of
a spouse under a gay-marriage ban. The deprivation is total.
Further, there is no evidence of a "polygamous orientation" causing
an inborn and unalterable need for the close companionship of multiple
partners (though some people may prefer it) to the exclusion of any such
companionship with a single partner. There is, however, strong evidence
of a homosexual orientation causing a person to need the close
101 Volokh, supra note 88, at 12-13 & nn.34-37 (quoting gay-marriage supporters who cite
love between same-sex partners as a rationale for gay marriage).
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companionship of a same-sex partner to the exclusion of an opposite-sex
partner. The ban on polygamous marriage is the denial of state and social
support for a preference, perhaps a strong one, for the companionship of
many others. The ban on gay marriage, however, is the denial of state and
social support for any companionship with even one other person.
b. The Communitarian Distinction Between Gay Marriage
and Polygamy
On the communitarian issue--the effect of recognition on
society--the differences between gay marriage and polygamous marriage
are more pronounced. There is evidence that married people are healthier,
happier, and wealthier than those who are single.' 0 2 It is reasonable to
think that marriage has contributed to that correlation through the legal and
social support that comes with it. Gay marriage is a good idea because it
will benefit not only the gay couple, but their families (including their
children), friends, neighbors, and taxpayers, whose burdens to care for the
gay partners singly would be greater.
While multi-partner marriages might benefit the partners involved,
the much greater potential for jealousy and rivalry among the partners
makes for a volatile arrangement, reducing the expected benefits to them
and to everyone else. In a multi-partner marriage, it may also be unclear
who has primary caretaking responsibility if a partner becomes sick or
injured; there is no such uncertainty in a two-person marriage. 103 While
we have some evidence that children do well when raised by same-sex
couples, 1°4 we have no evidence they do well when raised in communal
10 2 See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETrER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000).
103 See RAUCH, supra note 63, at 77.
104 William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and
America's Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN: MARRIAGE & CHILD WELLBEING 97, 100,
102-04 (2005), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usrdoc/06_FOC_15-
2_fall05_Meezan-Rauch.pdf (reviewing more than fifty studies and other materials, and
concluding that children of same-sex couples do as well as children of opposite-sex
couples); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of
Parents Matter?, AM. Soc. REv., Apr. 2001, at 159, 176 (reviewing twenty-one studies of
gay parents and their children and finding no differences of social concern between
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living arrangements. Since multi-partner marriages have almost always
taken the form of one man having many wives, recognizing such marriages
presents special risks of exploitation and subordination of women, which is
inconsistent with our society's commitment to sexual equality. There is no
comparable concern raised by gay marriage.
In human history, polygamy has correlated strongly with societies
that are illiberal and undemocratic, with no representative democracy,
voting, or universal education. In contrast, gay marriage is arising in the
most liberal societies, characterized by representative democracy,
widespread franchise, and universal education. Why does this correlation
exist? Several explanations are possible, but two are most relevant here.
First, modem liberal societies have emphasized values like individualism
and gender equality that seem inconsistent with polygamy as it has been
practiced. Gay marriage, by contrast, is fully consistent with these values.
Second, polygamy takes more women than men out of the marriage pool,
since multi-partner marriages have overwhelmingly taken the form of one
man married to multiple women. This leaves heterosexual men with fewer
marriage opportunities. Unattached men with poor marital prospects
destabilize societies, 105 and large numbers of such men in a society require
strong mechanisms of state control to rein them in. Gay marriage helps
ensure marriageable partners for everyone: polygamy does the opposite,
with potentially anti-liberal, undemocratic, and socially destabilizing
consequences. 106
Whatever the strength of a Burkean case against gay marriage, 1
7
the Burkean case against polygamy is much stronger. Polygamy, unlike
gay marriage, has been tried and rejected. Many human societies have
practiced it at one time or another and almost all have abandoned it. Gay
marriage, by contrast, has never been tried and rejected. Looking at
children of gay parents and children of heterosexual parents), available at http://www.e-
noah.net/ASA/MO/articles/stacey.pdf.
105 RAUCH, supra note 63, at 129.
106 1 thank Jon Rauch for this insight.
10 7 See Volokh, supra note 88, at 39 (characterizing the Burkean objection to gay marriage
as relatively serious, since historically, gay marriage has been all but absent from
civilization).
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history, polygamy is something human society is evolving from, gay
marriage is something that society is evolving towards.
Perhaps none of the considerations discussed above are decisive
against the recognition of polygamous marriages. For each point that has
been made, there are possible responses from polygamy advocates. Nor is
it the object of this discussion to make a case against the recognition of
polygamous marriage. Nevertheless, this discussion illustrates that gay
marriage and polygamous marriage present very different issues of history,
data, logic, and experience. Importantly, nothing in this complex
discussion of history, data, logic, or experience turns on whether gay
marriage has previously been recognized. Gay marriage and polygamous
marriage should each be evaluated on their own merits, and not treated as
if one is a necessary extension of the other.
c. Gay Marriage, Polygamy, and Chicken Little
Finally, it should be said that slippery-slope arguments about
marriage, especially polygamous marriage, have a certain Chicken Little
quality about them. Throughout the extensive history of fundamental
changes in the institution of marriage similar warnings have greeted every
proposed reform. For example, in 1910, the United States Supreme Court
rejected the right of women to sue their husbands for abuse, calling such an
idea a "radical and far-reaching" change that would "revolutionize the law
governing the relation of husband and wife as between themselves."' 0 8
The ominous slide to polygamy has also been a favorite trope, with
the same warnings once made in the context of allowing interracial
marriage. In the Nineteenth Century, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of a white man for criminal fornication with a black
woman. 109 When the defendant protested that he and the woman were
married in a state that recognized interracial marriages, the court rejected
the defense, stating that the recognition of such relationships would lead to
108 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1910).
109 State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872).
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"the father living with his daughter... in wedlock" and "[t]he Turk...
establish[ing] his harem at the doors of the capitol .... ",110
This is not to say that warnings about slippery slopes, even about
slippery slopes in marriage reform, have never proven true.111 But it is to
say that nothing in the fundamental case for gay marriage brings society
any closer to the harem than it was when the Tennessee Supreme Court
warned about it more than a century ago.
IV. CONCLUSION
Why should we care? What does it accomplish to rebut the bad
arguments? Maybe nothing: attitudes about gay marriage tend to follow
from certain experiences one has or certain overarching principles one
adopts, regardless of the specific arguments. Indeed, attitudes about gay
marriage tend to correlate closely with general attitudes about
homosexuality. People who believe that homosexuality is a benign
variation of human sexuality tend to favor gay marriage. People who
believe homosexuality is a harmful/sinful/pathological deviation from
normal sexuality tend to oppose gay marriage.1 1 2 So at the end of the day
maybe arguments don't move people much on this issue.
But I operate on the faith that eliminating bad arguments at least
may help focus the public debate on issues that really matter, the good
l0lOd
111 See Volokh, supra note 88, at 4-7 (citing examples of warnings about slippery slopes in
the marriage context that proved true, including the constitutional evolution of sexual
autonomy; and "gay rights" legislation that contributed to the recognition of a right to
same-sex marriage in Massachusetts).
112 This correlation is not logically necessary. A person who accepts the benign-variation
view of homosexuality might oppose gay marriage because he thinks there is something
uniquely heterosexual about marriage. Or he might oppose it because he believes, in
Burkean fashion, that a long-standing practice deserves a strong presumption and that gay-
marriage supporters have not overcome the strong presumption in favor of the long-
standing practice of recognizing only male-female marriages. By contrast, a person who
accepts the harmful/sinful/pathological view of homosexuality might support gay marriage
because she thinks that encouraging homosexuals to settle down and marry will help make
the best of a bad situation for the homosexuals and society generally.
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arguments on both sides, rather than on distractions. This clarifying effect
may improve the quality of the debate and even help move the moveable
middle in one or the other direction. Of course, my hope is that
clarification will move them in the direction of supporting gay marriage.
This article demonstrates that three common arguments against gay
marriage-the definitional, procreation, and polygamy slippery-slope
arguments--are quite bad, indeed they are the worst of the lot. While each
has some appeal, each is badly flawed as a matter of logic, experience,
politics, or some combination of the three. While respect is due to the
academics and commentators who have made these arguments, we should
move on to other, stronger arguments against gay marriage that better test
the affirmative case for gay marriage. This discussion has not, except by
implication, made an affirmative case for gay marriage. That remains to be
done.
